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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
TRISTAM B. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8522

ROSWELL MILLER, III,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from an order entered by the trial
court on the 22nd day of March, 1956, in favor of Plaintiff
and Respondent, ordering the Defendant and Appellant to
answer certain questions propounded to him in a deposition
(R. 47-48).
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Plaintiff, Tristam B. Johnson, commenced this action
against the Defendant, Roswell Miller, III, to recover damages for the alienation of affections and criminal conversation of Plaintiff's former wife (R. 1-4). Defendant and
Plaintiff's former wife were married and living in Salt
Lake City, Utah at the time this action was commenced,
and were at that time and for some time had been residents
of the State of Utah (R. 1, 14, 65, p. 2). Plaintiff's complaint alleges generally that between January, 1954 and
July, 1955, Defendant alienated the affections of Plaintiff's
wife and engaged in criminal conversation with her. Defendant's motion for more definite statement, to require
Plaintiff to allege the time and place the alleged wrongful
misconduct occurred, was denied (R. 11). Thus, Plaintiff
was not limited by his complaint as to the particular times
and places at which the alleged acts occurred.
On January 13, 1956, prior to the filing of Defendant's
answer, Plaintiff took the deposition of the Defendant upon
oral examination (R. 65). Defendant refused to answer
many of the questions on the specific ground that the
answers might tend to incriminate him (R. 65, at p.p. 7,
8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37). No other ground
for refusing to answer said questions was stated. Thereafter, pursuant to Plaintiff's motion (R. 23-24), the trial
court entered the order from which this appeal was taken,
ordering the Defendant to answer the questions and· assessing attorneys' fees against Defendant in the sum of $100.00
(R. 47-48).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts which are material to this appeal relate primarily to the record and history of the case from the commencement of the action to the present appeal. Since Appellant's brief does not disclose the sequence of events, the
following summary of the litigation from the commencement of the action to the entry of the order of the trial
court is necessary :
1. On November 8, 1955, Plaintiff commenced suit
against the Defendant and a complaint was filed setting
forth two causes of action, one for alienation of affections,
and the other for criminal conversation (R. 1-6).
2. On November 28, 1955, a stipulation was entered
into by the parties and an order was entered giving the
Defendant until December 8, 1955 to answer or otherwise
plead to Plaintiff's complaint (R. 7).
3. On December 5, 1955, Plaintiff served notice upon
the Defendant that Defendant's deposition would be taken
on December 21, 1955 (R. 8).
4. On December 8, 1955, Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss and a motion to require Plaintiff to make a more
definite statement (R. 9).
5. At the request of the Defendant and based upon
his illness, the deposition was continued until January 4,
1956. Subsequently, at the further request of the Defendant, the deposition was continued until January 13, 1956.
6. On January 5, 1956, Plaintiff served notice· that
Defendant's motion to dismiss and to make a more definite
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statement would be called up for hearing on January 11,
1956 (R. 12).
7. On January 11, 1956, Defendant's motion came on
for hearing; Defendant did not appear to argue in support
of said motions, and the trial court denied both motions and
granted the Defendant ten days in which to file an answer
to Plaintiff's complaint (R. 13).

8. On January 13, 1956, Defendant's deposition was
taken before Hyrum R. Moulton, a certified shorthand reporter ( R. 65) .
9. On January 23, 1956, Defendant filed his answer
denying generally the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint
(R. 14-15).
10. On February 17, 1956, Plaintiff filed a motion
pursuant to Rule 37 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an order directing and compelling the Defendant to answer the questions propounded in said deposition.
On the same date, a notice was served and filed, calling said
motion up for hearing on February 27, 1956 (R. 23).
11. On or about February 23, 1956, pursuant to Defendant's request, the above motion was stricken from the
calendar.

12. On March 1, 1956, Plaintiff se·rved and filed a
demand for trial, certificate and order (R. 51).
13. Plaintiff's motion to compel Defendant to answer
the questions propounded in said deposition was reset to be
heard before the court on March 14, 1956.
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14. On March 9, 1956, pursuant to an ex parte order
of the court, Defendant filed an amendment to his ans.wer
pleading for the first time the statutes of New Jersey and
New York abolishing suits for alienation of affections (R.
16-17).
15. On March 14, 1956, Plaintiff's motion was argued
to the trial court and was taken under advisement (R. 2542).
16. On March 14, 1956, the same day Plaintiff's motion was heard by the court, Defendant obtained leave ex
parte and filed an amendment to the amendment filed on
March 9, 1956, pleading certain other foreign statutes (R.
19-20).
17. On March 16, 1956, Defendant again obtained
leave ex parte from the court and filed a second amendment
to the amendment filed March 9, 1956 (R. 21-22).
18. On March 21, 1956, further proceedings and stipulations were held and made before the trial court to allow
Defendant to introduce still more statutes for the first time
(R. 43-46).
19. On March 22, 1956, the trial court enteTed its
written order granting Plaintiff's motion and ordering
Defendant to answer the questions propounded in the
deposition (except such questions as were objected to on
the ground of privilege between husband and wife). Plaintiff was awarded One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) as reasonable attorneys' fees in obtaining said order, on the ground
that Defendant's refusal to answer s.aid questions was without substantial justification.
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The deposition of Defendant was taken on January 13,
1956, prior to the filing of Defendant's answer. The deposition was taken by Plaintiff for the purpose of discovery
and to obtain evidence from the Defendant that would other•
wise have required a great deal of expense and the examination of numerous witnesses from many jurisdictions. The
Defendant refused to answer all of the questions propounded
with reference to his conduct with Plaintiff's former wife,
Helen Harris Johnson. In answer to the first such question, Mr. McBroom, counsel for the Defendant, stated (R.
65, p. 7) :
"Just a moment. The witness declines to answer
the question because the question calls for an answer
that may tend to incriminate the witness."
Defendant's refusal to answer the other questions concerning this subject merely referred back to the above objection.
At no time was_ any object~on to the questions propounded
interposed on the ground that the causes of action complained -of were barred by statutes in certain other states
or that the answers would tend to degrade the Defendant.
Plaintiff's motion to compel the Defendant to answer
said questions was filed on February 17, 1956 and it was
noticed to be heard on February 27, 1956 (R. 23). Defendant did not even plead the statutes of the other states,
which he now relies upon, until on and after March 9, 1956
(R. 16-17). Had it not been for the indulgence of Plaintiff
in agreeing that his motion would not be called for hearing
on February 27, 1956, these statutes would not even have
been part of the record prior to the court's order from
which this appeal is taken.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE ISSUES RAISE,D BY POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF WERE NOT PROPERLY IN
ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
POINT II
THE STATUTES RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT DO NOT LEGALLY JUSTIFY THE REFUSAL BY APPELLANT TO ANSWER THE
QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED.
POINT III
THE ORDER APPEALED FROM DOES NOT
VIOLATE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN Arw ARDING RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ISSUES RAISED BY POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF WERE NOT PROPERLY IN
ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
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The first and primary ground relied upon by Appellant
for the reversal of the order of the trial court relates to the
existence of certain statutes in the states of New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Nevada and Wyoming abolishing
the causes of action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Appellant studiously avoids pointing out,
however, as is so clearly shown by the above statement of
facts and the record on file herein, that these statutes were
not in issue before the trial court.
One can search the deposition of the Defendant in vain
for any objection whatsoever based on these statutes on
which Defendant now relies. As quoted supra on page 6,
Defendant's sole objection to the questions propounded
related to the issue of self incrimination.
Not until after the date originally set for the hearing
on Plaintiff's motion to compel the answers to said questions did the Defendant even plead the statutes in question
(R. 19-22). At the time Defendant's deposition was taken
these statutes were not mentioned and they had not been
injected into the case. At the hearing on Plaintiff's motion,
counsel for Plaintiff objected to the raising of this additional ground as a basis for Defendant's refusal to answer
the questions and argued that the Defendant waived any
reliance upon said statutes by virtue of his failure to object
and by the denial of his motion to dismiss (R. 34, 38-40).
It is one of the most basic rules of evidence that a party
cannot object to the admission of evidence on one specific
ground at the trial and upon appeal argue that the evidence
was erroneously admitted because of another and different
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objection. 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 248; 3 Am.
Jur., Appeal and Error, Sec. 344-346. The same principle
is applicable to the situation in this case. Defendant should
not be allowed to object to questions posed on deposition on
one ground and then rely on another completely different
ground at a later hearing to sustain his position.

POINT II
THE STATUTES RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT DO NOT LEGALLY JUSTIFY THEREFUSAL BY APPELLANT TO ANSWER THE
QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED.
It is Plaintiff's earnest contention that the trial court
was not obligated to take cognizance of this issue, since it
was not properly before that court. Defendant's contention
however, that the existence of statutes abolishing causes
of action for alienation· of affections in the various states
cited justifies the refusal to answer the questions asked
to him on deposition, is wholly without merit.
As previously noted, Plaintiff's com plaint alleges a
cause of action for alienation of affections and criminal
conversation. The complaint alleges that between January,
1954 and July, 1955, defendant alienated Plaintiff's wife's
affections and engaged in unlawful relations with her. The
nature of the tort involved necessarily comprehends a course
of conduct over a period of many months. As is indicated
by the questions posed at the deposition, it is Plaintiff's
contention that the alienating acts committed by the De-
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fendant occurred in many diffe·rent states in the United
States, including possibly the states of Utah and Idaho, as
well as in Canada. In order for Plaintiff to present his case,
it will be necessary to establish a chain of related events
occurring at many different times and places.
The purpose of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
the provisions in particular dealing with discovery, are to
provide a litigant with an efficient and economical method
of discovering and proving the facts essential to his cause
of action. Where the facts involved are peculiarly within
the knowledge of one of the parties, the use of a deposition
provides the best and sometimes the only possible means of
obtaining this information.
_An example of the type of questions which Defendant
refused to answer are the following:
"Were there ever any occasions when you and
Helen (Plaintiff's former wife) would meet when
either Tris (Plaintiff) or your wife was not there in
January, February or March of 1954 ?" (R. 65, p. 7).
"Did you and Helen, in January, February or
March or April, 1954 ever have any prearranged
meetings in places other than Princeton, New J ersey?" (R. 65, p. 8).
1
" \ \ hen you were in New York City, did you
ever have occasion to see Helen whose name was
then Johnson ?" ( R. 65, p. 16) .
"Did you ever make a visit to Twin Falls, Idaho
in January, February or March, 1955 ?" (R. 65, p.
32).
"Were you at the Lake O'Hara Lodge (Canada)
from the fourth of July, 1954 to the tenth day of
July, 1954 ?" (R. 65, p. 32).
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All of the foregoing questions and the many others
which Defendant refused to answer were obviously designed
to show this course of conduct by the Defendant to and with
the Plaintiff's wife.
Rule 26 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides with respect to the scope· of examination upon deposition as follows:
"Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30 (b) or (d), the deponent may be
examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the examining party, or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location
of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for
objec·tion that the testirnony will be inadmissibl'e at
the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Emphasis added.)
It might be noted that the Defendant made no attempt,
prior to the deposition, to have the scope of examination
limited as provided in Rule 30 (b) .
An examination of the questions propounded in the
deposition clearly indicates that they all involved matters
which were relevant to the subject-matter of the Plaintiff's
claim. Even assuming the validity of the argument under
Point I, of Defendant's brief, the very most that can be
said is that some doubt may exist as to the admissibility
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of certain parts of the evidence sought to be obtained. Rule
26 (b) , quoted above, specifically provides that the inadmissibility of the evidence at the trial is no· ground for its exclusion on deposition if it is reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. There can be no
doubt as to the importance of the information sought to be
obtained from the Defendant and its value in discovering
admissible evidence when the nature of the cause of action
is considered.
Recognizing the fact that the inadmissibility of the
evidence is not sufficient to justify Defendant's refusal to
answer, Plaintiff then attempts to bolster his position by
relying on Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
which provides that a witness need not answer questions
"which will have a direct tendency to degrade his character
unless it is to the very fact in issue or to a fact from which
the fact in issue would be presumed." See State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229. In the present case, the
degrading conduct of the Defendant is the precise fact in
issue. Even if the evidence as to conduct in certain states
were inadmissible, certainly the fact that the immoral acts
took place in one state would indicate and tend to show the
disposition of the deponent to commit such acts and that
the same conduct was pursued and continued by the Defendant in other states, including even Utah, Idaho, and in the
various provinces of Canada.
It should again be pointed out that Defendant likewise did not rely on Section 78-24-9 or the claim of degradation of character at the time the questions were propounded
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or before the trial court on the hearing on Plaintiff's motion belo"\V (R. 25-42).
Appellant admits in his brief (p. 3), as is the fact,
that part of the questions under consideration concern his
conduct with Plaintiff's former wife in the State of Idaho
and in Canada. No claim is made, however, that these
jurisdictions have enacted statutes barring causes of action
for alienation of affections or criminal conversation. Such
actions are clearly recognized in the State of Idaho. Riggs
v. Smith, 52 Idaho 43, 11 P. 2d 358; Johnson v. Richards,
60 Idaho 150, 294 Pac. 507. The Canadian Courts likewise
recognize causes of action for alienation of affections and
criminal conversation. Lellis v. Lambert, 24 0. A. R. 653;
Ne~vton v. Hardy, 149 L. T. 165; Brune v. Stensto, 2 D. L. R.
795, 52 B. C. R. 532 (1938) ; J&owder v. Roy, 2 D. L. R. 284,
0. W. N. 222 (1944) ; and Swan v. Mathers, 0. W. N. 495
(1942). Defendant's argument completely fails as to conduct
in these jurisdictions, and as heretofore observed, certainly
the conduct of Defendant with Plaintiff's former wife in
New York, Nevv Jersey, Pennsylvania and any other state
is relevant and probative as to what took place between
them in Canada, Idaho, Utah, and other jurisdictions.
The principal decision relied upon by Defendant, In re
Glasser, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 723 (1950) involved a completely
different problem from that presented on this appeal. It
was a decision by the New York court, a jurisdiction where
the cause of action is abolished, and related to conduct
within the State of New York. In the present case, the
court entering the order is not faced with a local statute
prohibiting such actions and the conduct involved occurred
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in many other jurisdictions, only some of which have such
statutes.
POINT III
THE ORDER APPEALED FROM DOES NOT
VIOLATE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
Appellant contends, and indeed it is the only matter
properly in issue, that the questions propounded on the
deposition required answers that would tend to incriminate
him. The only incrimination to v1hich Appellant refers and
to which he could possibly be subjected is under the laws of
jurisdictions other than the State of Utah, i. e. the states in
which some of the conduct inquired into may have occurred
and the Federal courts under the Mann Act.
No showing was made before the trial court that the
Plaintiff was in any imminent danger of prosecution by
the authorities of these other jurisdictions or as a matter
of fact in any danger whatsoever (R. 25-46). As heretofore
pointed out, Defendant is now and for sometime prior to the
commencement of this action was a citizen of the State of
Utah. The possibility of criminal prosecution in geographically remote jurisdictions based upon the conduct involved
it at least extremely remote. Most of the questions which
the Defendant refused to answer did not even call for
answers which could incriminate him under the laws of any
jurisdiction.
All of the cases relied upon by Defendant in his brief
are outmoded Federal cases involving the question of whether
the privilege applies in a Federal Court sitting within a state
to the danger of criminal prosecution in the State courts
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of that state. It is respectfully submitted that these cases
are not in point on the issue here presented. The only danger
of prosecution conceivably related to the questions propounded to the Defendant would be under the laws of other
states or jurisdictions.
The general rule is stated in 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses,
Sec. 51, as follows:
"In considering a witness' claim of privilege
against self incrimination, the court will not take
notice of the criminal laws of another state or sovereignty."

*
"* * *

*

*

*

As defined by the great majority of
the courts in this country the protection afforded
by our constitutional guarantees against compulsory
self incrimination is confined to the giving of testimony which would tend to subject witnesses to criminal liability or to a penalty within the jurisdiction
and under the sovereignty in which the privilege is
involved * * * all of the more recent cases support the rule that the privilege against self incrimination does not extend to protect a witness as to
matters which may tend to incriminate him under
the laws of another jurisdiction."
70 C. J., Witnesses, Sec. 882, likewise concludes:
"In a proceeding in the courts of a state, a witness is not privileged to refuse to answer because
of the apprehension of criminal prosecution in another state."
Confronted with this same problem, the Supreme Court
of Vermont in State v. Wood, 134 Atl. 697, stated the general rule:
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"In disposing of the question whether the respondent had the right to exercise the privilege of
silence, we do not notice the criminal laws of any
other state nor whether they were violated by her
while on the trip in question. The only danger to be
considered is such as arose within this jurisdiction
and under the state sovereignty."
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Republic of
Greece v. J(oukouras, 162 N. E. 345 held:
"The question is, can the privilege of silence
be invoked by a witness when his answer will tend
to prove that he has infringed the criminal laws of
a foreign jurisdiction by act or conduct which does
not violate the criminal laws of the jurisdiction
where he is examined? We are of opinion the privilege against self incrimination extends only to crimes
which may be prosecuted within the latter jurisdiction, and the rule of protection is confined to what
may tend to subject the witness to penalties within
this juris diction and under the state sovereignty
* * * Neither the Fifth Amendment nor the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is violated by holding that the privilege against self incrimination does not extend to
crimes which are not subject to prosecution in the
jurisdiction where the privilege is asked."
Even the more recent Federal cases decided since the
cases on which Plaintiff relies are in accord with this view
and have held that the privilege does not apply to the danger
of prosecution in another jurisdiction or in state courts.
United States v. Mu1"dock, 284 U. S. 141, 52 Sup. Ct. 63,
76 L. Ed. 210 (1931) ; Cla.iborne v. United States, 77 F. 2d
682 (8th Cir. 1935) ; and MilleT' v. United States, 95 F'. 2d
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492 (9th Cir. 1938). The Murdock case was decided subsequent to any of the Federal cases relied upon by Plaintiff.
In United States v. Murdock, the Supreme Court held
that the fact that a federal immunity statute did not protect against state prosecution was not grounds for refusal
to answer. The Court stated at 284 U. S. 149:
"The English rule of evidence against compulsory self incrimination, on which historically that
contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not
protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of another country. * * * This court
has held that immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that a witness shall not be excused from
giving evidence on the ground that it will incriminate him, and also that the lack of state power to
give witnesses protection against federal prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute. The
principle established is that full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the
protection furnished by the rule against compulsory
self incrin1ination."
In the case at hand, it is clear that Plaintiff is immune
to prosecution in the State of Utah, because no inquiry was
made during the deposition as to any acts of misconduct
occurring in this state.
Even the older federal cases which have announced
the contrary result referred to by Plaintiff require that
the danger of prosecution in the state court be a real and
present danger and not just a remote possibility.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
Respondent's motion to compel Defendant to answer the
questions propounded was made pursuant to Rule 37 (a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides in
part that:
"If the motion is granted and if the court
finds that the refusal was without substantial justification the court shall require the refusing party
or deponent and the party or attorney advising the
refusa~ or either of them to pay the examining party
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including reasonable attorneys'
fees."
The trial court expressly made a finding in its order
that the refusal of the Defendant to answer the questions
was without substantial justification (R. 47-8). This finding
was made pursuant to the discretion granted to the trial
court after a complete hearing of the matter with ample
opportunity on the part of the trial judge to evaluate the
merit of Defendant's refusal (R. 25-46).
An examination of the deposition (R. 65) and the nature of the questions asked, reveals no substantial justification for Defendant's refusal to answer. All of the questions re-lated to facts that will be in issue at the trial and
to conduct that will, if necessary, be proved by other witnesses. Defendant's refusal has only served to delay the
ultin1ate conclusion and disposition of this action. The trial
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court's order with respect to attorneys' fees was fully within
the proper limits of the trial court's discretionary authority.

CONCLUSION
The arguments presented and cases cited in Appellant's
brief do not justify the refusal of Appellant to answer th~I
questions propounded in the deposition. The argument
raised under Point I of Appellant's brief was not in issue
before the trial court, is without merit, and raises issues'
which may be material at the trial of the case, but which,
are not now properly before this Court. Appellant's constitutional privilege against self incrimination was not violated. The order of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DENNIS McCARTHY,
DAVID E. SALISBURY,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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